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Abstract	  The	   Commission	   is	   the	   EU’s	   legislative	   agenda-­‐setter	   but	   is	   nonetheless	   often	  disregarded	   in	   empirical	   studies	   on	   legislative	   decision-­‐making	   in	   the	   Council	  and/or	  European	  Parliament.	  Still,	   legislation	  originates	  in	  the	  Commission	  and	  it	  may	  be	  that	  it	  matters	  which	  Commissioner	  is	  responsible	  for	  which	  legislative	  proposal.	  Accordingly,	  this	  paper	  analyzes	  whether	  the	  vote	  choice	  of	  Members	  of	   the	   European	   Parliament	   (MEPs)	   is	   influenced	   by	   characteristics	   of	   the	  proposing	   Commissioner.	   It	   is	   hypothesized	   that	   shared	   partisan	   or	   national	  background	  increase	  the	  chances	  of	  an	  MEP	  approving	  of	  legislation	  proposed	  by	  a	   Commissioner	   because	   of	   shared	   ideological	   commitments,	   party	   political	  interests	   and	   national	   perspectives.	   MEPs’	   vote	   choice	   will	   be	   analyzed	   using	  multilevel	   logistic	   regression,	   taking	   proposal-­‐level	   and	   member	   state-­‐level	  factors	  into	  account.	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Introduction	  European	   Commissioners	   are	   formally	   required	   to	   carry	   out	   their	  responsibilities	   independently	   of	  member	   states’	   influence	   and	   to	  promote	   the	  general	  interest	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  in	  doing	  so	  (Article	  17,	  TFEU).	  Yet,	  most	  Commissioners	  are	  party	  politicians	  with	  previous	  political	  careers	  in	  their	  home	  countries	   (Döring,	   2007;	  Wonka,	   2007).	   Furthermore,	   they	   are	   selected	   by	   the	  national	  governments	  that	  are	  composed	  of	  political	  parties	  and	  are	  expected	  to	  defend	  national	   interests.	  The	  Commission	   is	   the	  EU’s	   legislative	  agenda-­‐setter	  establishing	   whether	   national	   or	   party	   political	   links	   influence	   its	   behavior	   is	  important	  for	  understanding	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  whole	  legislative	  process.	  There	   is	   anecdotal	   evidence	   suggesting	   that	   Commissioners	   indeed	   do	   not	  always	   act	   independently	   of	   their	   background.	   For	   example,	   when	   the	  Commission	  proposed	  decreasing	  new	   cars’	   greenhouse	   gas	   emissions	   in	   early	  2008,	  the	  German	  Commissioner	  for	  Enterprise	  and	  Industry,	  Günter	  Verheugen,	  argued	   against	   such	   targets	   –	   presumably	   to	   protect	   Germany’s	   important	   car	  industry	   (Goldirova,	   2008;	   Willis,	   2010).	   Another	   example	   highlights	   the	  partisan	  influence	  on	  the	  Commission.	  In	  2004	  the	  Party	  of	  European	  Socialists	  formed	  a	  ‘high-­‐level	  group’	  chaired	  by	  the	  then-­‐incumbent	  Trade	  Commissioner	  Pascal	   Lamy	   to	   formulate	   proposals	   for	   the	   Commission’s	   agenda	   for	   2005	   to	  2009	   (Beunderman,	   2004).	   With	   its	   focus	   on	   the	   Lisbon	   Strategy	   and	  sustainability	   the	   Commission’s	  work	   program	   indeed	   picked	   up	   some	   central	  issues	   of	   the	   Socialist	   2004	   EP-­‐election	   campaign	   (cf.	   Commission,	   2005;	   PES,	  2004).	  	  This	   article	   analyses	   whether	   nationality	   and	   partisanship	   provide	   linkages	  between	   the	   Commissioner	   proposing	   new	   legislation	   and	   the	   Member	   of	   the	  European	  Parliament	  (MEPs).	  Previous	  studies	  have	  found	  that	  voting	  cohesion	  in	   the	   EP	   is	   higher	   along	   ideological	   lines	   than	   along	   national	   lines	   (Hix	   and	  Noury,	  2009;	  Hix,	  2002).	  Furthermore,	  Hagemann	  and	  Høyland	  (2010)	  as	  well	  as	  Mühlböck	   (2013)	   found	   that	   political	   parties	   provide	   for	   linkages	   between	   the	  Council	  and	  the	  EP.	  Based	  on	  a	  previous	  study	  that	  linked	  voting	  in	  the	  Council	  to	  the	   proposing	   Commissioner	   (Killermann,	   2014),	   this	   paper	   focuses	   on	   the	  relation	  between	   the	  EP	  and	   the	  Commission	  and	   the	   role	   that	  nationality	   and	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partisanship	   play	   in	   linking	   these	   institutions.	   It	   is	   hypothesized	   that	   MEPs	  sharing	   national	   and	   partisan	   ties	   with	   the	   proposing	   Commissioner	   are	   less	  likely	  to	  cast	  a	  negative	  vote.	  	  	  
Commissioners	  as	  Agents	  In	  scholarly	  accounts	  of	  EU	  policy-­‐making,	  the	  Commission	  was	  long	  treated	  as	  a	  technocratic	   –	   or	   even	   apolitical	   –	   actor	   (e.g.	   Majone,	   2001;	   Moravcsik,	   2002:	  613).	   Accordingly,	   intergovernmental	   bargains	   were	   deemed	   decisive	   for	  European	   integration	  and	  Commissioners	  were	   relegated	   to	   the	   role	  of	   faithful	  implementers	   of	   governmental	   decisions.	   In	   contrast,	   Wonka	   has	   argued	   that	  Commissioners	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  political	  rather	  than	  technocratic	  actors	  –	  at	   least	  since	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Single	  European	  Act	   in	  1987	  (Wonka,	  2007:	  185).	  Accordingly,	  Commissioners	  are	  expected	   to	  have	  policy	  preferences	  and	  to	  use	   the	  power	  delegated	   to	   them	  to	  act	  on	   these	  preferences.	  Following	   this	  argument,	   this	   article	   focuses	   on	   nationality	   and	   partisanship	   as	   sources	   of	  Commissioners’	  preferences.	  	  The	   nomination	   stage	   is	   generally	   expected	   to	   be	   the	   most	   efficient	   ex	   ante	  control	   stage	  principals	  have	  at	   their	  disposal	   (e.g.	  Calvert	  et	  al.,	  1989;	  Epstein	  and	   O’Halloran,	   1994;	   as	   summarized	   by	   Reenock	   and	   Poggione,	   2004).	   Each	  member	  state	  nominates	  its	  Commissioner,	  who	  needs	  the	  support	  of	  a	  qualified	  majority	  vote	  of	   the	  member	  states	   in	   the	  Council	  and	  a	  simple	  majority	   in	   the	  EP.	  The	  appointment	  process	  thus	  represents	  the	   initial	  delegation	  of	  authority	  from	  the	  member	  states	  as	  principals	  to	  the	  Commissioners	  as	  their	  agents	  (see	  for	  instance	  Pollack,	  1997;	  Tallberg,	  2002).	  Commissioners	  are	  –	  to	  some	  degree	  –	  agents	  of	   the	  member	  state	  governments	  who	  selected	   them.	  Thus,	   there	  are	  both	  national	  and	  often	  party	  political	  ties	  between	  a	  member	  state	  government	  and	  “their”	  Commissioner.	  	  Governments	   try	   to	   alleviate	   the	   delegation-­‐related	   problems	   (see	  Hölmstrom,	  1979)	   in	   Commissioner-­‐nomination	   in	   several	  ways.	   First,	   in	   pre-­‐appointment	  screening	   governments	   apparently	   take	   cues	   from	   past	   behaviour,	   as	   Döring	  (2007)	   and	  Wonka	   (2007)	   describe.	   They	   then	   nominate	   high-­‐profile	   national	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politicians	   who	   are	   members	   of	   a	   governing	   party	   –	   increasingly	   so	   as	   the	  Commission’s	  role	  as	  legislative	  agenda-­‐setter	  was	  strengthened	  throughout	  the	  various	  Treaty	  reforms	  (see	  Crombez	  and	  Hix,	  2011).	  By	  using	  their	  possibility	  of	  pre-­‐appointment	   screening	   and	   nominating	   candidates	   with	   a	   public	   track	  record,	   the	   Council’s	   behaviour	   thus	   conforms	   to	   the	   expectations	   of	   the	  principal-­‐agent	   literature.	   Second,	   also	   after	   appointment,	   the	   principals	   have	  their	   set	  of	   ‘sticks’	   available	   to	   control	   their	   agents.	  Here,	   career	  prospects	   are	  assumed	   to	   play	   an	   especially	   significant	   role,	   which	   has	   become	   increasingly	  important	   over	   time	   as	   a	   Commissioner-­‐post	   is	   no	   longer	   necessarily	   the	   last	  career	  step	  (see	  Vaubel	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  It	   is	  assumed	  that	  Commissioners	  do	  not	  have	  the	  capacities	  to	  closely	  monitor	  the	   actions	   of	   their	   colleagues	   (cf.	   Laver	   and	   Shepsle,	   1996,	   1999;	  Martin	   and	  Vanberg,	  2005).	  Due	  to	  this	  lack	  of	  oversight,	  the	  responsible	  Commissioner	  has	  Commission-­‐internal	  agenda-­‐setting	  power	  –	  he	  or	   she	   thus	  enjoys	   ‘ministerial	  discretion’	   within	   his	   or	   her	   portfolio	   (Hörl	   et	   al.,	   2005;	   Wonka,	   2008:	   68).	  However,	  as	  the	  Council	  and	  the	  EP	  are	  essential	  for	  policies	  to	  be	  adopted,	  the	  extent	   to	   which	   Commissioners	   can	   act	   independently	   is	   limited.	   The	  Commission	   needs	   to	   be	   sensitive	   to	   the	   preferences	   of	   these	   institutions,	   to	  formulate	   legislative	  proposals	   that	  have	  a	   good	   chance	  of	   adoption	   (Crombez,	  1997;	  Leuffen	  and	  Hertz,	  2010;	  Steunenberg,	  1994;	  Tsebelis	  and	  Garrett,	  2000).	  	  Overall,	   I	   argue	   that	   there	   are	   national	   and	   party	   political	   links	   between	  Commissioners	   and	   the	   member	   state	   governments	   that	   nominated	   them.	  Commissioners	   are	   expected	   to	   have	   preferences	   based	   on	   their	   national	  background	   and	   partisan	   affiliation.	   The	   primarily	   responsible	   Commissioner	  strategically	  uses	  the	  discretion	  s/he	  enjoys	  in	  the	  College	  of	  Commissioners	  to	  influence	  the	  formulation	  of	  legislative	  proposals	  in	  line	  with	  these	  preferences	  –	  while	   ensuring	   that	   the	  proposal	   is	   acceptable	   to	   the	  other	   veto	  players	   in	   the	  legislative	   process.	   Thus,	  we	   should	   expect	  MEPs	   sharing	   these	   preferences	   to	  vote	  in	  favour	  of	  that	  Commissioner’s	  proposals.	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The	  Influence	  of	  Commissioner	  Characteristics	  in	  the	  Legislative	  Process	  Because	   of	   the	   nomination	   procedure,	   it	   is	   reasonable	   to	   assume	   that	   the	   ties	  between	  a	  Commissioner	  and	  his	  or	  her	  home	  country	  are	  stronger	  than	  the	  ties	  with	   the	   other	   member	   states.	   Even	   though	   Commissioners	   are	   formally	   the	  agents	   of	   all	   member	   states	   it	   is	   their	   home	   country	   that	   is	   responsible	   for	  choosing	  nominees	  without	   outside	   interference.	   Even	   if	   a	   nominee	   is	   rejected	  during	   the	   process,	   no	   other	   actor	   is	   in	   a	   position	   to	   propose	   an	   alternative	  candidate.	  This	  would	  suggest	  that	  a	  legislative	  proposal	  from	  a	  Commissioner	  is,	  on	  average,	  more	   sensitive	   to	   the	   interests	  of	  his	  or	  her	  home	  country	   than	   to	  those	   of	   any	   other	   country.	   Accordingly,	   the	   policy	   content	   of	   proposals	  Commissioners	  make	  is	  expected	  to	  generally	  be	  in	  line	  with	  the	  preferences	  of	  the	  Commissioner’s	  home	  country	  so	  that	  MEPs	  coming	  from	  the	  same	  member	  state	   are	   expected	   to	   hardly	   contest	   proposals	   coming	   from	   their	   ‘own’	  Commissioner.	  
Hypothesis	   1	   (National	   Perspective):	   Legislative	   proposals	   are	   less	   likely	   to	   be	  contested	  by	  MEPs	  that	  come	  from	  the	  same	  member	  state	  as	  the	  proposing	  Commissioner.	  	  Furthermore,	   shared	  partisan	   ties	   are	   expected	   to	   ease	   cooperation	  during	   the	  Commission’s	   term	   in	   office.	   It	   is	   generally	   assumed	   that	   persons	   sharing	  partisan	  affiliations	  also	  have	  similar	  preferences.	  This	  could	  be	  due	  to	  either	  of	  two	   processes.	   First,	   a	   set	   of	   preferences	   could	   induce	   individuals	   to	   join	   a	  specific	  party	  that	  is	  then	  accordingly	  composed	  of	  like-­‐minded	  people.	  Second,	  regardless	   of	   why	   a	   person	   joined	   a	   party,	   parties	   are	   deemed	   to	   be	   most	  effective	   when	   acting	   cohesively.	   Electorally,	   this	   makes	   for	   a	   recognizable	  ‘brand	   name’	   (e.g.	   Cox	   and	   McCubbins,	   1993);	   and	   in	   the	   legislative	   process,	  parties	   reduce	   the	   transaction	   costs	   involved	   in	  policy-­‐making	   (Aldrich,	   1995).	  While	  the	  party	  label	  is	  certainly	  valuable	  in	  the	  national	  context,	  its	  value	  at	  the	  European	  level	  is	  more	  diffuse	  (as	  discussed	  by	  Lindberg	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  Still,	  being	  a	   member	   of	   the	   same	   ‘party	   family’	   signals	   shared	   preferences	   and	   thus	  promises	  ready	  cooperation.	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Furthermore,	  after	  the	  resignation	  of	  the	  Santer	  Commission,	  the	  agency	  design	  was	  adapted	  upgrading	   the	   role	  of	   the	  European	  Parliament	   in	   the	  nomination	  process.	  Since	  1999	  new	  Commissioners	  are	  obliged	  to	  inform	  the	  EP	  about	  their	  policy	  goals	  and	   the	  scrutinizing	  process	   in	   the	  EP	   is	   reported	   to	  have	  become	  more	   intense	   than	   before	   (Kassim	   and	   Menon,	   2004:	   90).	   As	   a	   result,	   the	  principals	   gain	   additional	   information	   concerning	   their	   prospective	   agents.	  Wonka	  (2007)	  shows	  that	  the	  proportion	  of	  Commissioners	  being	  a	  member	  of	  one	   of	   the	   governing	   parties	  markedly	   increased	   after	   the	   Santer	   Commission	  and	   that	  also	  –	  albeit	   to	  a	   lesser	  extent	  –	  more	  politically	  visible	  persons	  were	  appointed.	   It	   thus	   seems	  clear	   that	   the	  nomination	  process	  has	  been	   tightened	  after	   the	   negative	   experience	   governments	   had	   with	   the	   Santer	   Commission.	  Consequently,	   it	   can	   be	   expected	   that	   the	   extra	   care	   given	   to	   selecting	   good	  agents	  in	  the	  nomination	  process	  pays	  dividends	  during	  the	  legislative	  process.	  	  
Hypothesis	   2	   (Partisan	   Perspective):	   Legislative	   proposals	   are	   less	   likely	   to	   be	  contested	   by	   MEPs	   that	   share	   partisan	   ties	   with	   the	   proposing	  Commissioner.	  	  To	  summarize,	  the	  primarily	  responsible	  Commissioner	  is	  expected	  to	  use	  his	  or	  her	   agenda-­‐setting	  power	   to	   formulate	   legislative	  proposals	   in	   line	  with	  his	   or	  her	  policy	  preferences.	  This	  discretion	  is	  limited	  by	  the	  other	  actors	  involved	  in	  the	   legislative	  process	  –	  with	   this	  article	   focusing	  on	   the	  European	  Parliament.	  By	  anticipating	  the	  preferences	  of	  these	  actors,	  Commissioners	  seek	  to	  formulate	  realistically	   ‘adoptable’	   proposals	   –	   with	   shared	   nationality	   and	   partisanship	  expected	   to	   indicate	   shared	   preferences.	   MEPs	   sharing	   such	   ties	   with	   the	  proposing	  Commissioner	  are	  thus	  expected	  to	  have	  a	  lower	  likelihood	  of	  casting	  a	  contesting	  vote	  than	  MEPs	  not	  sharing	  such	  ties.	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Voting	  in	  the	  European	  Parliament	  Research	   on	   voting	   in	   the	  EP	  mostly	   uses	   roll-­‐call	   votes,	   i.e.	   votes	   in	  which	   an	  MEP’s	   vote	   is	   registered	   as	   opposed	   to	   secret	   voting.	   Previous	   research	   found	  that	  voting	   in	   the	  EP	   is	  predominantly	  structured	  along	   ideological	   lines,	  while	  nationality	  plays	  a	  minor	  role	  (e.g.	  Hix	  and	  Noury,	  2009;	  Hix,	  2002).	  The	  question	  that	  many	  analyses	  of	  EP-­‐voting	  are	  then	  pursuing	  is	  whether	  national	  parties	  or	  the	   transnational	   party	   groups	   that	   are	   formed	   inside	   the	   EP	   exert	   more	  influence.	  While	   the	   former	   mostly	   control	   and	   organize	   the	   national	   election	  campaigns,	  the	  latter	  control	  important	  resources	  within	  the	  EP.	  When	  analysing	  the	  votes	  cast	   in	  1999	  and	  2000,	  Hix	   (2002)	   found	  national	  parties	   to	  be	  more	  important	  in	  determining	  MEP	  voting	  behaviour	  than	  transnational	  parties.	  This	  is	  especially	  so	  if	  national	  parties	  can	  tightly	  control	  their	  MEPs	  (Hix,	  2004)	  and	  if	   the	   chances	   of	   re-­‐election	   depend	   on	  national	   parties	   (Faas,	   2003).	  When	   in	  doubt,	  MEPs	   rather	   vote	  with	   their	   national	   party	   than	  with	   the	   transnational	  party	  group,	  although	  there	  often	  is	  a	  ‘grand	  coalition’	  between	  the	  socialist	  and	  Christian	  democratic	  party	  groups	  (cf.	  Kreppel,	  2002:	  161).	  With	  regard	  to	  inter-­‐institutional	  coalition	  building	  and	  the	  role	  political	  parties	  play	  in	  linking	  the	  Council	  and	  the	  EP,	  Hagemann	  and	  Høyland	  (2010:	  829)	  show	  that	   “disagreement	   in	   the	   Council	   spills	   over	   into	   disagreement	   inside	   the	  Parliament.”	  That	  is,	  if	  the	  vote	  in	  the	  Council	  was	  divided,	  it	  is	  more	  likely	  that	  also	   EP-­‐voting	   is	   divided	   along	   ideological	   lines,	   i.e.	   that	   the	   'grand	   coalition‘	  breaks	   down.	   Likewise,	   Mühlböck	   (2013)	   finds	   that	   voting	   cohesion	   across	  institutions	  is	  mostly	  due	  to	  an	  overarching	  consensus.	  According	  to	  her	  analysis,	  the	   European	   Party	   Group	   exerts	  more	   influence	   on	   the	   voting	   behaviour	   of	   a	  member	   of	   the	  EP	   than	   the	   voting	   behaviour	   of	   that	  member’s	  minister	   in	   the	  Council	  (Mühlböck,	  2013:	  580)	  –	  the	  partisan	  ties	  between	  the	  institutions	  thus	  seem	  stronger	  than	  the	  national	  ties.	  	  Overall,	   there	   is	   some	  evidence	   that	  political	  parties	  shape	  voting	  behaviour	   in	  the	  Council	  and	  that	  they	  also	  provide	  for	  linkages	  between	  the	  Council	  and	  the	  EP,	   while	   national	   ties	   between	   the	   institutions	   seem	   weak.	   However,	   when	  linking	   Council	   voting	   to	   Commissioner	   characteristics,	   nationality	   takes	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precedence	   over	   partisanship	   in	   decreasing	   the	   likelihood	   of	   contestation	  (Killermann,	  2014).	  This	  paper	  mirrors	   the	  previous	  analysis	  by	   looking	  at	   the	  impact	   of	   shared	   national	   and	   partisan	   ties	   between	   the	   proposing	  Commissioner	  and	  the	  voting	  MEP	  on	  an	  MEP’s	  vote	  choice.	  	  
The	  Dataset	  This	   study	   uses	   roll	   call	   voting	   data	   from	   the	   6th	   (2004-­‐2009)	   and	   7th	   (2009-­‐2014)	  European	  Parliament.	  While	  being	  aware	  of	   the	  discussions	   that	  roll	  call	  votes	   are	   a	   non-­‐random	   sample	   of	   all	   votes	   cast	   in	   the	   EP	   (see	   for	   instance	  Hoyland,	   2010;	   Hug,	   2010),	   these	   are	   the	   votes	   that	   provide	   the	   information	  necessary	   to	   code	   the	   independent	   variables	   of	   interest.	   That	   is,	   whether	   the	  voting	   MEP	   (a)	   comes	   from	   the	   same	   member	   state	   as	   the	   proposing	  Commissioner	  (‘country	  match’)	  and	  (b)	  is	  a	  member	  of	  the	  same	  party	  group	  as	  the	  Commissioner’s	  national	  party	  (‘party	  match’).	  As	  this	  analysis	  focuses	  on	  the	  linkages	  provided	  by	  nationality	  and	  partisanship	  in	  the	  legislative	  process,	  only	  votes	  on	  legislative	  proposals	  will	  be	  included.	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  ‘country	  match’	  and	   ‘party	  match’	   variables,	   the	   analysis	   controls	   for	   whether	   the	   voting	  MEP	  comes	  from	  one	  of	  the	  member	  states	  that	  joined	  the	  EU	  from	  2004	  onwards	  and	  also	  for	  the	  member	  state’s	  budgetary	  status	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  that	  state’s	  material	  interest	   (cf.	  Bailer	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Hix	  and	  Noury,	  2009).	  The	  vote-­‐choice	  of	  MEPs	  will	   be	   analyzed	   using	  multilevel	   logistic	   regression,	   taking	   proposal-­‐level	   and	  member	  state-­‐level	  factors	  into	  account.	  [Preliminary	  results	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  presentation.]	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